Explanation Beyond Causation
A. Reutlinger and J. Saatsi (eds.), Oxford University Press. July 2018.
The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism
J. Saatsi (ed.), Routledge. 2018.
The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science
S. French and J. Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Publishing. 2011.
The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science
2nd, expanded edition of the Continuum Companion. Bloomsbury. 2014.
The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity
D. Rickles, F. French, and J. Saatsi (eds.), Oxford University Press. 2006
“Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability”
Philosophy of Science, 84(5), 2017.
“Symmetries and explanatory dependencies in physics”
(with S. French), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanation, A. Reutlinger and J. Saatsi (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2017.
“Realism and the limits of explanatory reasoning”
The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, J. Saatsi (ed.), Routledge, forthcoming in 2017.
“Explanation and explanationism in science and metaphysics”
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays, M. Slater and Z. Yudell (eds), Oxford University Press, 2017.
“Models, Idealisations, and Realism”
Models and Inferences in Science, E. Ippoliti, F. Sterpetti, and T. Nickles (eds.), 173-189, Springer, 2016.
“On the ‘Indispensable explanatory role’ of mathematics”
Mind, Early Access, 2016.
“What is theoretical progress of science?”
Synthese, First Online, 2016..
“Replacing recipe realism”
Synthese, First Online, 2016.
“On explanations from ‘geometry of motion'”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Advance Access, 2016.
“Historical inductions, old and new”
Synthese, First Online, 2015.
“Structuralism with and without causation”
Synthese, First Online, 2014.
“Inconsistency and scientific realism”
Synthese, 191, 2941–2955, 2014.
“Reassessing Woodward’s account of explanation: regularities, counterfactuals, and non-causal explanations”
With M. Pexton, Philosophy of Science, 80, 613–624, 2012.
“Mathematics and program explanations”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90, 579–84, 2012.
“On the Pessimistic induction and two fallacies”
Philosophy of Science, 72, 1088–98, 2005
— reprinted in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 2nd ed., Cover, Curd and Pincock (eds), W.W.Norton, 2012.
“Scientific realism and historical evidence: shortcomings of the current state of debate”
EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, de Regt et al. (eds), 329-304, Springer, 2012.
“The enhanced indispensability argument: representational vs. explanatory role of mathematics in science”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, 143–54, 2011
“Miraculous success? Inconsistency and untruth in Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory”
With P. Vickers, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, 29–46, 2011.
“Idealized models as inferentially veridical representations”
Models, Simulations, and Representations, C. Imbert & P. Humphreys (eds), Routledge, 234–49, 2011.
“Form vs. content driven arguments for realism”
New Waves in Philosophy of Science, P.D. Magnus & J. Busch (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, 8–28, 2009.
“Whence ontological structural realism?”
EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science, M. Suarez et al. (eds.), Springer, 255–65, 2009.
“Eclectic realism: the proof of the pudding”
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39, 273–6, 2008.
“Living in harmony: Nominalism and the explanationist argument for realism”
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 21, 19–33, 2007.
“Realism about structure: the semantic view and non-linguistic representations”
With S. French, Philosophy of Science, 73, 548–59, 2006.
“Ramseyfication and theoretical content”
With J. Melia, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57, 561–85, 2006.
“Reconsidering the Fresnel-Maxwell theory shift: how the realist can have her cake and EAT it too”
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 36, 509–38, 2005.
Surveys, Introductions, Reviews, etc.
Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy, Duncan Pritchard. (ed.) Oxford University Press, 2013.
With S. French. The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Continuum Publishing, 1–11, 2011.
“Travelling in new directions”
With S. French. The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science, 337–58, 2011.
— Revised for The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science, 357– 377, 2014.
“Recalling a Habermas-inspired experimental realism”
Review of The material realization of science: From Habermas to experimentation and referential realism by Hans Radder, Metascience, 23, 339–341.
Review of Mathematics and Scientific Representation by Chris Pincock
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012.
Review of Mathematics and Reality by Mary Leng
The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 17, 267–8, 2011.
“Grasping at realist straws”
Review of Exceeding Our Grasp by Kyle P. Stanford, Metascience, 18, 355–62, 2009.
“Critical Commentaries of Critical Rationalism”
Review of Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, eds. C. Cheyne & J. Worrall, Metascience, 16, 271–5, 2007.